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A green reform is not always green 
 






This paper analyses a tax reform, explicitly conceived by policy makers to be climate-friendly, 
that partly replaces a high vehicle registration tax by road user charging and allows for 
differentiation of the remaining registration tax by fuel efficiency. A microeconomic framework 
is proposed to analyze such a reform. For the case of Denmark, the analysis shows that the 
reform is likely to yield a significant and robust welfare gain. However, it seems not unlikely 





This paper analyses a revenue neutral tax reform that shifts the tax burden from the fixed costs 
of passenger car ownership to variable costs of car use. The analysis is carried out in a Danish 
context using a microeconomic framework that accounts for a variety of effects. The analysis 
indicates that the reform is likely to be welfare improving given the current high Danish 
registration tax. The main issues are the merits of more sophisticated congestion charging 
schemes in the context of such a reform and whether such a reform is likely to reduce the 
environmental costs of passenger car use. 
 
The context for the analysis is that the Danish Parliament has agreed in principle on a green tax 
reform that shifts the tax on passenger cars from fixed to variable costs (Transportministeriet, 
2009). The elements of the proposed reform are the following: i) the registration tax is reduced 
by at least 50%; ii) the registration tax is further differentiated to encourage sales of more fuel 
efficient cars; iii) a national road pricing system is introduced and the revenues from road user 
charging (RUC) replace the lost revenues from the registration tax. 
 
The stated intention of the reform is to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars. There are 
also other concerns that the reform can help address. First, the current Danish registration tax is 
very high. Cars are subject to VAT at a rate of 25%. The registration tax is added on top of this 
at a progressive rate, with a top rate of 180%. The average tax rate on new cars, including VAT, 
is 160%. There is pressure from the EU to reduce the registration tax as it is considered to be an 
obstacle to the Single Market (EU Commission, 2005). There is also widespread dissatisfaction 
with the high car prices in Denmark and reduction of the registration tax is likely to be popular.  
 
Another concern is that projections indicate that future traffic growth will substantially overtake 
the planned growth in infrastructure capacity (Infrastrukturkommissionen, 2008a). Allocating 
more funds for infrastructure is difficult due to the pressure that an aging population causes on 
public expenditure. So the result will be a dramatic increase in congestion unless something else 
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is done. Here road user charging is seen as a way to manage demand and deal with the expected 
increase in congestion.  
 
It is an explicit political constraint that the reform should be revenue neutral. This is important 
for reasons of political acceptability. The constraint also facilitates the analysis as it obviates 
the need to consider the effect of revenue change. It is, however, clear that relaxing the revenue 
constraint would give opportunity for increasing welfare. Whether total taxation of cars should 
then ideally be smaller or larger depends on the difference in the cost of public funds from car 
taxation and other sources. In the case of Denmark where car taxes are very high, it is likely 
that efficiency could be increased by reducing the combined taxation of car ownership and use. 
 
This paper proposes a welfare economic analysis of this reform using a small microeconomic 
model. The model is partial and thus leaves out possible effects from other markets such as the 
labour market. This is acceptable if such effects are small relative to the effects in the transport 
market. It is calibrated to the present situation in Denmark and to elasticities with respect to 
income and variable costs for car ownership and use estimated from time series data. The model 
is explained in detail in section 2 below.  
 
The main point of the model is that it provides a consistent microeconomic framework that 
represents both the extensive and intensive margin of car ownership and use. This is a crucial 
model property for an analysis of a policy reform that involves a large shift from fixed to 
variable costs. The model comprises a distribution of representative households, distinguished 
by their propensity to drive. The households choose between owning 0, 1 or 2 cars. 
Furthermore, the model represents a number of different types of car uses. These types 
distinguish kilometres driven in different geographical areas and by different time of day. The 
model comprises separate cost relationships for each type, such that different degrees of 
congestion and other external costs can be represented. The infrastructure is represented by 
traffic type specific volume-delay relationships. Thus, decreases in traffic volumes result in 
time cost reductions and thereby welfare improvements. The model allows different types of 
kilometres to be more or less substitutes as desired. The model takes differentiation of the 
registration tax into account by interacting with a car choice model that predicts the average car 
from the household choice between more than 1000 car makes, models and variants.  
 
The results indicate that a reform can lead to a substantial welfare improvement. Most of this 
effect is due to the reduction in deadweight loss gained from the shift of the tax burden from the 
very high registration tax to a tax on kilometres (see De Borger, 2001 for a theoretical analysis 
of two-part tariffs). A comparatively much smaller gain can be obtained from differentiation of 
the road user charge.  
 
Differentiation of the registration tax shifts the composition of the car fleet in a more fuel 
efficient direction. But the general reduction of the registration tax leads to upsizing of the cars 
and the combined effect on the fuel efficiency of the average car is predicted to be small. The 
isolated effect of reducing the registration tax is a larger car fleet and more kilometres driven in 
total. The isolated effect of the introduction of RUC is fewer kilometres driven per car and 
fewer cars. The combined effect depends on the elasticities implicit in the model. The calibrated 
model predicts an increase in the size of the car fleet and also an increase in the total traffic 
volume and the total fuel consumption. The increase in total fuel consumption is not large. 
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Taking model uncertainty into account, the conclusion is therefore that the reform is more likely 
than not to increase CO2  emissions and hence not be green in this sense. However, other 
environmental improvements may be achieved if the reform is able to move traffic from cities 
to rural areas where noise and air pollution make less harm. The results indicate that a 
differentiated RUC can achieve such improvements. 
 
In section 2 below the theoretical model is presented and in section 3 the transformation to a 
simulation model is described along with the main assumptions. Section 4 presents the analyses 
and the results are discussed in section 5.  
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3 A concern regarding the aggregate volume-delay relationships for the corridors is whether they capture all the 
congestion that is present. The link specific relationships do not take into account the congestion arising in relation to 
bottlenecks like highway approaches and exits. 
4 Aggregate speed-flow curves have been developed for urban areas (Geroliminis & Daganzo, 2008; May et al., 2000). 
5 It is however likely that a reduction in the price of new cars will decrease the average lifetime of cars. This point is 












Table 1 Calibration 
  Target  Model  Weight
Share of households 1 car  0.46 0.4597 10
Share of households 2 cars  0.11  0.1132  10 
Total km per year  11400 11400 10
Type 1: Km corridors congestion   61.4 61.7 5
Type 2: Km corridors residual  2845 2859 5
Type 3: Km Copenhagen congestion   432 432 5
Type 4: Km Copenhagen residual   829 848 5
Type 5: Km small cities   1476 1467 5
Type 6: Km rural areas  5759 5731 5
Elasticity No. cars wrt. income  0.63 0.64 1
Elasticity Total km wrt. income  1.06 0.94 1
Elasticity No. cars wrt. variable costs  ‐0.36 ‐0.43 1












































































































































1: MEC congestion cars  0.42 0.02 0.87 0.24  0  0
2: MEC congestion heavy  0.58 0.03 0.58 0.21  0  0
3: MEC noise, accidents, air  0.11 0.11 0.62 0.61  0.62  0.14
4: MEC CO2   0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03  0.03
5: Tax in variable costs  ‐0.55 ‐0.55 ‐0.55 ‐0.55  ‐0.55  ‐0.55
6: RUC  0 0 0 0  0  0

















6 The Ministry of Transport has estimated the annualized costs to 2.5 billion DKK including administration costs and 
















Table 4 RUC levels, DKK per km 
Type  Base   A  B  C 
Type 1 corridors congestion   0.00 0.22 0.62 0.62
Type 2 corridors residual  0.00 0.22 0.08 0.08
Type 3 Copenhagen congestion   0.00 0.22 1.72 1.71
Type 4 Copenhagen residual   0.00 0.22 0.97 0.96
Type 5 small cities   0.00 0.22 0.54 0.53










7 The fee is increased from 1000 to 2000 DKK per km per litres below the threshold and the rebates are modified from 
2000 to 4000 DKK per km per litres above. The threshold value is increased from 16 to 18 km per litre for petrol cars 
and from 18 to 20 km per litre for diesel cars.   
8 In 2007 there were 354 cars per 1000 inhabitants in Denmark. Corresponding figures for other countries are 556 
(Germany), 467 (UK and Sweden) and 494 (France), see Eurostat. 
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Table 5 Cars per household 
  Base  A  B  C 
Share with 0 cars  0.43  0.34  0.34  0.34 
Share with 1 cars  0.46  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Share with 2 cars  0.11  0.16  0.16  0.16 
Cars per household  0.69  0.82  0.82  0.82 
Diesel share  46.6    46.7   46.7  47.1 
Average weight, kg  1193  1206  1206  1208 

















Table 6 Kilometres and CO2 per household  
  Base  A  B  C 
Total km  11398 11619 11578 11596
Type 1 corridors congestion   62 63 49 49
Type 2 corridors residual  2859 2915 3040 3044
Type 3 Copenhagen congestion   432 438 279 281
Type 4 Copenhagen residual   848 864 728 730
Type 5 small cities   1467 1496 1359 1360
Type 6 rural areas  5731 5843 6123 6131














Table 7 The government budget per household, DKK per household 
  Base  A  B  C 
Annual car tax  1897  2318  2313  2308 
Registration tax  5724  4065  4055  4066 
RUC  0  2501  2523  2510 
Type 1 corridors congestion   0  13  31  31 
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Type 2 corridors residual  0  627  240  238 
Type 3 Copenhagen congestion   0  94  480  479 
Type 4 Copenhagen residual   0  186  706  702 
Type 5 small cities   0  322  728  727 
Type 6 rural areas  0  1258  338  333 
Tax in variable costs (fuel)  6234  6355  6332  6342 
VAT change  0  ‐491  ‐475  ‐478 
System costs  0  ‐893  ‐893  ‐893 






Table 8 Speeds, km per hour  
  Base  A  B  C 
Type 1 corridors congestion   99.8 99.4 104.8 104.8
Type 2 corridors residual  112.3 112.3 112.2 112.2
Type 3 Copenhagen congestion   46.6 46.4 52.0 52.0
Type 4 Copenhagen residual   53.7 53.6 54.4 54.4
Type 5 small cities   54.0 54.0 54.0 54.0































Table 9 Welfare economic evaluation, DKK per household per year 
  A vs. base  B vs. base C vs. base 
Equivalent variation  1236  1130 1187
Externalities  ‐74  269 263
Local environment  ‐55  162 158
Climate   ‐10  ‐9 ‐9
Heavy vehicles  ‐9  115 114
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